Public trust and government betrayal by Christopher Phelan
Federal Reserve Bank of Minneapolis
Research Department Staﬀ Report 283
January 2001
Public Trust and Government Betrayal∗
Christopher Phelan
Federal Reserve Bank of Minneapolis
ABSTRACT
This paper presents a simple model of government reputation which captures two characteristics of
policy outcomes in less developed countries: governments which betray public trust do so erratically,
and, after a betrayal, public trust is regained only gradually.
∗This paper was formerly titled “Randomly Bad Government.” The author has beneﬁted greatly from discus-
sions with Andrew Atkeson, V.V. Chari, Harold Cole, Patrick Kehoe, and Narayana Kocherlakota, and from
the research assistance of Aleh Tsyvinski. The views expressed herein are the those of the author and not
necessarily those of the Federal Reserve Bank of Minneapolis or the Federal Reserve System.1. Introduction
Government policy in developed countries is boring. It is relatively stable and predictable,
and, for the most part (at least relative to less developed countries), promises made are
promises kept. Governments keep their promises despite the fact that policymakers face a
well-known time-consistency problem. That is, it is seldom in the short-run best interest of a
government to keep capital taxes low, honor its debt obligations, or inﬂate the currency only
by the expected amount.1
Much of the theory on credible government policy concerns itself precisely with ac-
counting for this ability of governments to make and keep promises. In trigger models (such
as in Chari and Kehoe 1990), good outcomes correspond to a particular subset of equilibria
of a game with multiple equilibria. In these good equilibria, households trust the govern-
ment and the government does not betray this trust because a deviation by the government
causes a reversion to a worse equilibrium. With an inﬁnite period model and suﬃciently little
discounting, such a threat induces the government not to deviate.
In reputation models ( s u c ha si nB a r r oa n dG o r d o n1983, Celentani and Pesendorfer
1996, and Cole and Kehoe 1998), good outcomes occur both in ﬁnite period models and
in inﬁnite period models without explicit history-dependent (or trigger) strategies. In such
models, the type of government is unobserved by households and the government’s reputation
is the household sector’s belief (its Bayesian posterior) that the government is of a particular
type. If the government is possibly an honest (or irrational) type that simply cannot betray
the trust of households, then a betrayal destroys the belief that the government is possibly
honest. This loss of doubt regarding the type of government can be a suﬃcient inducement
1The seminal paper is Kydland and Prescott (1977).for governments of all types (honest or not) to act in a trustworthy manner.
Ad i ﬃculty of both trigger and reputation models, however, is their ability to account
for bad outcomes. Standard reputation models (speciﬁcally those in which government type
is permanent) overexplain good outcomes in that they predict good outcomes will always
occur.2 Trigger models, on the other hand, allow for bad equilibrium outcomes (and, in fact,
rely on them) but generally miss key characteristics of bad outcomes.
Bad outcomes tend to have two characteristics which do not easily match existing
models. One is that bad outcomes tend to be associated with unpredictable government
policy. That is, for long periods of time, exchange rates, tax policies, or monetary policies
are stable, and then the government freezes all bank accounts (Brazil), massively devalues
the currency in the foreign exchange market (Argentina and many others), declares the ﬁat
currency valueless (Russia), defaults on debt (too many to mention), or massively inﬂates
the currency (again, too many to mention). The other characteristic most models tend to
miss is that after such episodes, trust (in the form of money or debt holdings or capital
accumulation) is rebuilt only gradually.
In contrast, I present here a very simple model which, in spirit, can capture the most
basic characteristics of bad policy outcomes. In my model, a government can be either
good, which means it must tax output at a low enough rate to make production worthwhile,
or bad, which means it has the option of either taxing at this low rate or conﬁscating all
output. Government type cannot be directly observed by households, making the model
close to the reputation models of Kreps and Wilson (1982), Milgrom and Roberts (1982),
2In a ﬁnite period reputation model with permanent types, bad outcomes can occur toward the end of
time. However, in the limit as the number of dates approaches inﬁnity, or in the Markov perfect equilibrium
of the inﬁnitely repeated game, the good outcome always occurs.
2Barro and Gordon (1983), and their successors.3 When government type is permanent, this
model has a result in line with those in these earlier papers–as long as there is not too much
discounting, in the Markov perfect equilibrium, both good and bad governments act in a
trustworthy manner. This holds for any probability that the government is good, as long as
the probability is positive.
The surprising result of this paper is that if government type can change (speciﬁcally,
if it follows a Markov process), then no matter how small the transition probabilities are and
regardless of the rate of discount, the unique outcome of a Markov perfect equilibrium has
the bad government following a mixed strategy. Bad governments do not routinely act in a
trustworthy or an untrustworthy manner, but instead randomize regarding whether to betray
the households. Thus, policy is unpredictable. Further, the equilibrium has the property that
trust is rebuilt only gradually. The percentage of households which produce in equilibrium is
directly related to how long it has been since a conﬁscation of output by the government.
The intuition behind these results is straightforward. If very few or no households
trust the government, a bad government has little or nothing to gain by betraying the trust
i th a sb e e ng r a n t e d . F u r t h e r ,i fb a dg o v e r n m e n t sa l w a y sb e t r a yt r u s t ,a sl o n ga ss o m e
probability exists that the government truly is good, a bad government can earn a reputation
as a good government by acting good for one date. This enhanced reputation is valuable to
the bad government, and thus bad governments always betraying trust is not an equilibrium.
However, if, in a proposed Markov perfect equilibrium, bad governments always act like good
governments, then there is no punishment to betraying. It is better to betray today and
3In particular, Cukierman and Meltzer (1986), Cole, English and Dow (1995), and Celentani and Pe-
sendorfer (1996) deal with reputation in a government policy setting.
3follow the equilibrium from tomorrow on rather than follow the equilibrium from today on.
Thus, any Markov perfect equilibrium must entail at least some mixing.
This mixing implies interesting dynamics. Speciﬁcally, if bad governments mix and
good governments always act in a trustworthy manner, then observing good behavior by the
government causes households to gradually increase their Bayesian posterior that the gov-
ernment is good. Further, for a bad government to value a good reputation (a necessary
condition to get the bad government to be willing to mix) a higher percentage of house-
holds must produce, the higher their Bayesian posterior. Thus, trust increases gradually in
equilibrium.
In Section 2, I present the model. In Section 3, I deﬁne Markov strategies and Markov
equilibria. In Section 4, I consider the special cases in which government type is common
knowledge and in which government type is private but ﬁxed through time. In Section 5,
I assume government type follows a nondegenerate Markov process. Here, the main results
of the paper are proved. In Section 6, I characterize the Markov perfect equilibrium of the
limiting economy where the probability that the government is good goes to zero. In Section
7, I consider non-Markov equilibria, and in Section 8, I conclude.
2. The Model
Consider the following simple game. A continuum of households faces a sequence of govern-
m e n t sw h i c hc a nb eo ft y p egood or bad. The government’s type is not directly observable by
households. At each date t =0 ,...,∞,h o u s e h o l d sm o v eﬁrst, simultaneously to each other.
Each household can produce at cost c ag o o dw i t hv a l u eq or not produce. The government
and other households observe the measure (or fraction) µ of households which produce, but
4the action of any particular household is private to that household. After households move,
the government moves. A bad government can tax output at an exogenous rate τ < 1 or
conﬁscate all output. A good government has no choice to make. It always sets the tax to τ.
If measure µ of households produce, a bad government’s static payoﬀ is µτq if it taxes at rate
τ and µq if it conﬁscates all output. A good government’s payoﬀsa r en o td e ﬁned because it
never makes a choice. A household which does not produce receives a static payoﬀ of zero
regardless of the play of the government. A household which produces receives a payoﬀ of
(1 − τ)q − c>0 if the government taxes at rate τ and a payoﬀ of −c<0 if the govern-
ment conﬁscates all output. These assumptions ensure that a household should produce if it
anticipates that the government will tax at rate τ and should not produce if it anticipates
conﬁscation.
At date t =0the government is good with probability ρ0 ≥ 0.A tt h es t a r to fe a c hd a t e ,
a bad government is replaced by a good government with probability ² ≥ 0. Alternatively, a
good government is replaced by a bad government with probability δ ≥ 0. Government death
and rebirth is not observed by and cannot be directly communicated to households.4 Both
households and the bad government discount at the rate 0 < β < 1. The only additional
restriction on the parameters (τ,q,c,ρ0,²,δ) is
c
(1 − τ) q
< 1 − δ − ². (A1)
Since (1 − τ)q>c , assumption (A1) requires that the transition probabilities δ and ² be
suﬃciently small. This assumption is made to ensure that, in equilibrium, if a government
does not conﬁscate for a suﬃcient number of dates, it is trusted enough to ensure that
4This assumption plays a major role in the ﬁrm reputation models of Tadelis (1999) and Mailath and
Samuelson (2000).
5all households produce. If there is too much mixing between types (δ and ² are too high), a
history of not conﬁscating isn’t suﬃciently informative to ensure that all households produce.
No restrictions are put on the discount rate β (other than 0 < β < 1), and no
restrictions are put on the invariant (or long-run) probability that the government is of type
good, ²/(² + δ).T h u s ,ρ0 and ² can be set arbitrarily close to zero, which implies that this
model can be made (in a sense) arbitrarily close to a model in which it is common knowledge
that the government is bad.
3. Markov Strategies and Markov Equilibria
Deﬁne Markov strategies relative to the state variable ρ–the households’ posterior probability
that the government is of type good. A Markov strategy is a speciﬁcation of µ(ρ), the measure
of households which produce as a function of ρ,a n dπ(µ,ρ), the probability that a bad
government conﬁscates as a function of µ and ρ.
Since households are anonymous, they cannot individually aﬀect the play of the gov-
ernment or the future values of ρ and thus cannot individually aﬀect the future play of the
game. Whether a household should produce depends solely on whether the probability that
the government conﬁscates at the current date is at or below a cutoﬀ value, π∗.I np a r t i c u l a r ,
deﬁne π∗ such that
(1 − π





(1 − τ) q
< 1.
Households are said to be optimizing if for all ρ, µ(ρ) > 0 implies that (1−ρ)π(µ(ρ),ρ) ≤ π∗
6and µ(ρ) < 1 implies that (1 − ρ)π(µ(ρ),ρ) ≥ π∗. (Together, these inequalities imply that if
0 <µ (ρ) < 1,t h e n(1 − ρ)π(µ(ρ),ρ)=π∗.)
Note that if ρ is suﬃciently high (or households are suﬃciently conﬁdent that they
are facing a good government), households should produce regardless of the probability that
a bad government conﬁscates. Speciﬁcally, if ρ > 1−π∗,t h e n(1−ρ)π < π∗ for all π ∈ [0,1];
thus, household optimization implies that µ(ρ)=1 . Thus, while π∗ is the cutoﬀ probability
of conﬁscation, ρ∗ ≡ 1 − π∗ can be considered the cutoﬀ posterior.
Unlike households, a bad government can aﬀect the future play of the game and thus
cares how it aﬀects future values of ρ.I fag o v e r n m e n tc o n ﬁscates at date t,i tm u s th a v eb e e n
the bad type. Given the government was bad at date t,t h ep o s t e r i o ra td a t et +1is ρ0 = ²,
the probability that a bad government is replaced by a good government. If the government




ρ +( 1− ρ)(1 − π)
+ ² (1 −
ρ
ρ +( 1− ρ)(1 − π)
).
This function is strictly increasing in π.I np a r t i c u l a r ,ρ0(ρ,1) = 1 − δ, the highest possible
value for ρ. If households expect a bad government to conﬁscate with probability one, a bad
government can achieve the highest possible reputation by not conﬁscating.
Let V (ρ) denote the expected lifetime payoﬀ to a bad government associated with
strategy (µ,π).R e c u r s i v e l y ,
V (ρ)=π(µ(ρ),ρ)
h








A Markov strategy is said to respect government optimization if and only if for all
7(µ,ρ) such that π(µ,ρ) > 0,c o n ﬁscating is weakly preferred to not conﬁscating, or
qµ+ β(1 − ²)V (²) ≥ τqµ+ β(1 − ²)V (ρ
0(ρ,π(µ,ρ))),
and for all (µ,ρ) such that π(µ,ρ) < 1,n o tc o n ﬁscating is weakly preferred to conﬁscating,
or
qµ+ β(1 − ²)V (²) ≤ τqµ+ β(1 − ²)V (ρ
0(ρ,π(µ,ρ))).
(Together, these inequalities imply that if 0 < π(µ,ρ) < 1, the bad government must be
indiﬀerent between conﬁscating and not conﬁscating, and thus the above inequalities must
hold as an equality.)
A Markov strategy is said to be a Markov perfect equilibrium if it respects both
household and bad government optimization.
4. Special Cases
Assume, for the moment, that ρ0 = ² =0 , or that after all histories, it is common knowledge
that the government is the bad type. In this case, a Markov perfect equilibrium is simply the
fraction of households which produce µ and a probability that the bad government conﬁscates
π(µ), and an implied value
V = π(µ)[qµ+ β(1 − ²)V ]+( 1− π(µ))[τqµ+ β(1 − ²)V ].
Government optimization requires (for all µ)t h a ti fπ(µ) < 1, qµ + βV ≤ τqµ+ βV .S i n c e
τ < 1, the latter requires that π(µ)=1for all µ>0. Household optimization then implies
that µ =0 , leaving µ =0for all dates as the unique outcome of a Markov perfect equilibrium.5
5There is a continuum of Markov equilibria for this case, deﬁned by µ =0 , π(µ)=1for µ>0 and
π(0) ≥ π∗, but all have the same outcome path.
8This is not surprising. Without history-dependent strategies, only repetition of the one-shot
equilibrium is possible.
Next assume that ² = δ =0but that ρ0 > 0. This assumption brings the model
more in line with those in most papers regarding reputation in game theory (Kreps and
Wilson 1982, Milgrom and Roberts 1982, Celentani and Pesendorfer 1996, among others).
That is, government type is permanent (governments are never replaced) but is not observed
by households. Here, similar to the chain-store paradox papers, if the government ever
conﬁscates, then its type is known forever (ρ =0 ). Given this, V (0) = 0 because the
subgame following a conﬁscation is identical to the case considered above. If τq/(1 − β) >q
(or imitating the good type forever is preferred to the one-shot gain from conﬁscating all
output), then this game has a unique Markov perfect equilibrium outcome in which for all
ρ > 0, µ(ρ)=1 , π(1,ρ)=0(and thus ρ0 = ρ), and V (ρ)=τq/(1 − β). This is, again, not
surprising given the earlier work on reputation.
5. The General Case
Assume that ²>0 and δ > 0. That is, assume that at the start of each date, governments have
a positive probability of dying and being reborn as the other type. For simplicity, also assume
that ρ0 = ², implying that the game starts as if there were a conﬁscation at the preceding
d a t e .( T h ec a s ei nw h i c hρ0 6= ² is treated later.) I show here that there is a unique Markov
perfect equilibrium which always has the same structure. First, I simply assert and describe
this equilibrium strategy. Next, I show that this strategy satisﬁes household optimization
and bad government optimization if the bad government weakly wishes to conﬁscate if all
households produce. Following this, I show that no other Markov perfect equilibrium exists,
9and in the process, I show that a bad government strictly wishes to conﬁscate if all households
produce. Finally, I consider ρ0 6= ².
Let (ˆ µ, ˆ π) denote the unique Markov perfect equilibrium. The ﬁrst asserted character-
istic of this equilibrium is that if ρ < ρ∗, the bad government randomizes to make households
indiﬀerent to producing or not, or (1−ρ)ˆ π(ˆ µ(ρ),ρ)=π∗.W h e nπ = π∗/(1−ρ), the function
ρ0(ρ,π) simpliﬁes to
ρ
0∗(ρ)=ρ(1 − δ − ²)/ρ
∗ + ².
This function is linear, has a positive intercept, and has a slope greater than one. Thus,
starting from ², successive application of ρ
0∗(ρ) steps above ρ∗ in a ﬁnite number of steps
(denoted N). That is, under ˆ π, if fewer than N dates have passed since the last conﬁscation,
ρ < ρ∗ and ρ ≥ ρ∗ otherwise.
Let ˆ ρi, i ∈ {0,1,...,N} denote the value of ρ induced by ˆ π if i consecutive dates have
passed without a conﬁscation, and let ˆ µi =ˆ µ(ˆ ρi) and ˆ Vi = V (ˆ ρi).S i n c e 0 <
π∗/(1−ρ) < 1 for ρ < ρ∗,f o r(ˆ µ, ˆ π) to be a Markov perfect equilibrium, the bad government
must be indiﬀerent between conﬁscating and not conﬁscating for i<N . T h i si m p l i e st h a t
for i ∈ {0,...,N− 1},
ˆ Vi = qˆ µi + β(1 − ²)ˆ V0
ˆ Vi = τqˆ µi + β(1 − ²)ˆ Vi+1.
This is a sequence of 2N equations and 2N +1unknowns with full rank.
The second asserted characteristic of the unique equilibrium is that if ρ ≥ ρ∗, ˆ µ(ρ)=1
and ˆ π(1,ρ)=1 . That is, all households produce, and the bad government conﬁscates with
10probability one. This completes the description of government behavior and adds to the
above system the equation
ˆ VN = q + β(1 − ²)ˆ V0.
This system of linear equations has a unique solution where the vector {ˆ µ0, ˆ µ1,...,ˆ µN−1}
describes household play for ρ < ρ∗, completing the description of household play.
Is this an equilibrium? Given the strategy of the bad government, household optimiza-
tion is immediate. By construction, households are indiﬀerent between producing or not if
ρ ≤ ρ∗ and strictly prefer to produce when ρ > ρ∗. Again, by construction, a bad government
is indiﬀerent between conﬁscating or not for ρ < ρ∗. Thus, government optimization is satis-
ﬁed if the bad government weakly prefers to conﬁscate when ρ ≥ ρ∗, which is yet unproved.
This is shown as a consequence of proving that no other Markov perfect equilibrium exists,
to which I now proceed.
Let (µ,π) denote an arbitrary Markov perfect equilibrium. Analogously, let ρi, i ∈
{0,1,...,∞} denote the value of ρ induced by π if i consecutive dates have passed without
ac o n ﬁscation, and let µi = µ(ρi) and Vi = V (ρi).T h e ﬁrst step is to show that in any
Markov perfect equilibrium, µ(²)=µ0 > 0. This eliminates, among other things, a Markov
equilibrium in which no household ever produces because of fear that the bad government will
conﬁscate with probability one. This cannot be an equilibrium outcome because by deviating,
the government can costlessly earn a higher ρ and ensure a higher payoﬀ.
Lemma 1. µ0 > 0.
Proof. If µ0 =0 , then household optimization implies that π0 ≥ π∗. For a bad government
to conﬁscate with positive probability, its payoﬀ must be that of conﬁscating with certainty;
11that is, V0 = β(1−²)V0 or V0 =0 . Consider the following deviation strategy: never conﬁscate
until µ is positive. Either this strategy has a positive payoﬀ or µ =0forever. For µi =0 ,
πi ≥ π∗/(1 − ρi).S i n c e ρ0(ρ,π) is increasing in π, ρi ≥ ˆ ρi.T h u s , ρN > ρ∗ and household
optimization implies that µN =1 .
An immediate implication of Lemma 1 is that since V0 ≥ qµ0 + β(1 − ²)V0, V0 > 0.
The next result shows that in any Markov perfect equilibrium, µ(²)=µ0 < 1. This result
eliminates, among other things, a strategy in which all households always produce because
neither type of government will conﬁscate. This cannot be an equilibrium because it implies
no punishment for a deviating government.
Lemma 2. µ0 < 1.
Proof. If µ0 =1 ,t h e nV0 ≥ q + β(1 − ²)V0 or V0 ≥ q/(1 − β(1 − ²)). This lifetime payoﬀ is
possible only if µ =1at every date and π =1at every date. This outcome is inconsistent
with household optimization.
Lemmas 1 and 2 imply that 0 <µ 0 < 1 and thus that π0 =ˆ π0 = π∗/(1 − ²),
which implies that ρ1 =ˆ ρ1. The next two lemmas establish an induction argument to show
0 <µ i < 1 for all i<N.
Lemma 3. For i ≥ 1,i fqµi−1 + β(1 − ²)V0 = τqµi−1 + β(1 − ²)Vi,t h e nµi > 0.
Proof. If µi =0 , then household optimization implies that πi ≥ π∗/(1 − ρi) > 0.T h i s
implies that Vi = β(1 − ²)V0,o rVi <V 0 since V0 > 0.N e x t , s i n c e qµi−1 + β(1 − ²)V0 =
τqµi−1 + β(1 − ²)Vi and µi−1 ≥ 0, Vi ≥ V0.
Lemma 4. For i ≥ 1,i fµi−1 < 1, ρi < ρ∗ and qµi−1 +β(1−²)V0 = τqµi−1 +β(1−²)Vi,t h e n
µi < 1.
12Proof. If µi =1and ρi < ρ∗,t h e nπi ≤ π∗/(1 − ρi) < 1. This implies that Vi = τq + β(1 −










and thus Vi+1 >V i.T h e f a c t t h a t Vi+1 >V i implies that Vi+1 >q+ β(1 − ²)V0.T h u s ,
µi+1 =1and Vi+1 = τq + β(1 − ²)Vi+2.S i n c eVi = τq + β(1 − ²)Vi+1, Vi+1 >V i implies that
Vi+2 >V i+1. However, I can continue in this manner, getting µi+n =1for all n ≥ 1 and
Vi+n >q+β(1−²)V0, so that the bad government never conﬁscates. But the bad government
never conﬁscating implies Vi+n = τq/(1 − β(1 − ²)) for all n ≥ 0, contradicting Vi+1 >V i.
Since 0 <µ 0 < 1, qµ0 + β(1 − ²)V0 = τqµ0 + β(1 − ²)V1 a n dt h u sL e m m a s3a n d4
establish that 0 <µ 1 < 1 and ρ2 =ˆ ρ2. If I continue, this implies for i ≤ N, ρi =ˆ ρi and for
i ≤ N − 1, 0 <µ i < 1.B yd e ﬁnition, µN =1 . Lemma 5 establishes that a bad government
after N consecutive nonconﬁscations sets π =1 .
Lemma 5. For i ≥ N, πi =1 , µi =1 ,a n dVi = q + β(1 − ²)V0 > τq/(1 − β(1 − ²)).










13and thus VN+1 >V N. The fact that VN+1 >V N implies that VN+1 >q+ β(1 − ²)V0.T h u s ,
µN+1 =1and VN+1 = τq +β(1−²)VN+2.S i n c eVN = τq +β(1−²)VN+1, VN+1 >V N implies
that VN+2 >V N+1. As in the preceding proof, I can continue in this manner, getting µN+n =1
for all n ≥ 1 and VN+n >q+ β(1 − ²)V0, so that the bad government never conﬁscates. But
given this, VN+n = τq/(1 − β(1 − ²)) for all n ≥ 0, contradicting VN+1 >V N.
Thus, τq + β(1 − ²)VN+1 <q+ β(1 − ²)V0.T h i s i m p l i e s t h a t πN =1and ρN+1 =
1−δ > ρ∗;t h u s ,µN+1 =1 . The same logic implies that τq +β(1−²)VN+2 <q+β(1−²)V0;
thus, by induction, πi =1 , µi =1 ,a n dVi = V0 + β(1 − ²)V0 for all i ≥ N.S i n c ef o ri ≥ N,
Vi > τq + β(1 − ²)Vi, Vi > τq/(1 − β(1 − ²)).
Thus, I have established that the earlier asserted equilibrium satisﬁes government
optimization and is unique. The fact that µi and Vi are strictly monotonic for i ≤ N follows
quickly.
Lemma 6. For all (i,j) ∈ {0,...,N}2, such that i<j , µi <µ j,a n dVi <V j.
Proof. T h ef a c tt h a tt h eg o v e r n m e n ti sm i x i n gb e t w e e nc o n ﬁscating and not conﬁscating
when ρ = ² implies that
qµ0 + β(1 − ²)V0 = τqµ0 + β(1 − ²)V1.
Since µ0 > 0 and τ < 1,t h i si m p l i e st h a tV1 >V 0.G i v e nt h a t
V0 = qµ0 + β(1 − ²)V0
and
V1 = qµ1 + β(1 − ²)V0,
14the fact that V1 >V 0 implies that µ1 >µ 0.F o ra l li<N, government mixing from ρi implies
that
qµi + β(1 − ²)V0 = τqµi + β(1 − ²)Vi+1,
or, rearranging,




Since µ1 >µ 0, V2 >V 1. As above, I can use this to show that µ2 >µ 1,a n ds oo n .
This completes the characterization of the case where ρ0 = ². Consider initial ρ
values other than ρ = ², but requiring ρ0 ∈ [0,1). Here, I simply assert and verify the
equilibrium. Let ΓN =[ ρ∗,1), ΓN−1 = {ρ|ρ
0∗(ρ) ∈ ΓN}, ΓN−2 = {ρ|ρ
0∗(ρ) ∈ ΓN−1}, ...,
Γ0 = {ρ|ρ
0∗(ρ) ∈ Γ1}.N e x t ,l e tΓ−1 = {ρ|ρ
0∗(ρ) / ∈ Γ1 ∪ ...∪ ΓN}.B yc o n s t r u c t i o n ,ρi ∈ Γi
(i ∈ {0,...,N}), and Γ−1,Γ0,...,ΓN is a partition of [0,1).
For each ρ in Γi, i ≥ 0,l e tµ(ρ)=µi, π(ρ)=π∗/(1 − ρ),a n dV (ρ)=Vi for ρ ∈ Γi.
Thus, µ(ρ) and V (ρ) are step functions. This speciﬁcation satisﬁes household optimization
because (1 − ρ)π(ρ)=π∗, and thus households are indiﬀerent. To show that it satisﬁes
(bad) government optimization, consider ρ ∈ ΓN.D e v i a t i n g b y n o t c o n ﬁscating delivers
τq + β(1 − ²)VN <q+ β(1 − ²)V0 = VN.F o rρ ∈ ΓN−1, for the government to be willing to
randomize, V (ρ), µ(ρ) must satisfy
V (ρ)=τqµ(ρ)+β(1 − ²)VN
and
V (ρ)=qµ(ρ)+β(1 − ²)V0.
15These two linear equations are uniquely solved by V (ρ)=VN−1 and µ(ρ)=µN−1.I c a n
continue in this fashion to ρ ∈ Γ0.
This leaves ρ ∈ Γ−1, which consists of ρ suﬃciently small such that ρ
0∗(ρ) ∈ Γ0.( T h i s
includes ρ =0 .)F o rρ ∈ Γ−1, µ(ρ)=0and V (ρ)=β(1 − ²)V0. This holds because if
µ(ρ) > 0,t h e ni tm u s tb et h ec a s et h a t0 ≤ π(µ(ρ),ρ) ≤ π∗/(1−ρ). This in turn implies that
² ≤ ρ0(ρ,π(µ(ρ),ρ)) ≤ ρ
0∗(ρ).S i n c eb o t h² and ρ
0∗(ρ) are elements of Γ0, ρ0(ρ,π(µ(ρ),ρ)) ∈ Γ0.
Further, if the bad government conﬁscates, ρ0 = ² ∈ Γ0.T h u s ,f o rρ ∈ Γ−1, the continuation
for the bad government is the same whether it conﬁscates or not, and thus µ(ρ)=0is
necessary for bad government optimization. For households to be willing to set µ(ρ)=0 ,
one needs π(0,ρ) ≥ π∗/(1 − ρ). For the bad government to be willing to conﬁscate given
the current period payoﬀ is zero whether it conﬁscates or not, one needs ρ0(ρ,π(0,ρ)) ∈ Γ0.
Setting π(0,ρ)=π∗/(1 − ρ) accomplishes this, as does a neighborhood above this value.
Thus, for ρ0 ∈ Γ−1, there is not a unique Markov perfect equilibrium but, nevertheless, a
unique outcome in terms of µ(ρ0) and V (ρ0).
6. Limits and Discontinuities
In Section 4, I established that for ρ0 > 0, the Markov perfect equilibrium when ² = δ =0
has µ =1and π =0at all dates along the equilibrium path and delivers the value τq/(1−β),
as long as there is not too much discounting.6 This holds as well when 0 < δ < 1.S i n c e
when ρ0 =0 , ² =0 ,a n d0 ≤ δ < 1, the Markov perfect equilibrium has µ =0and π =1at
all dates along the equilibrium path and delivers a value of zero, there is a discontinuity at
ρ0 =0 ,( limρ0→0 V (ρ0) 6= V (0)). This discontinuity is not a new result. It could be considered
6By this, I mean τq/(1−β) >qor the lifetime value of a bad government receiving τq forever exceeds the
one-time payoﬀ from conﬁscating q.
16the main point of the standard reputation models of Kreps and Wilson (1982) and Milgrom
and Roberts (1982). In Section 5, I showed that this continuity disappears when ²>0.T h a t
is, limρ0→0 V (ρ0)=V (0) = β(1 − ²)V (²).
But having ²>0 when bringing ρ0 to zero is somewhat unfair. When ² =0 , considering
arbitrarily small ρ0 brings the economy with uncertainty about government type arbitrarily
close to one in which government type at all dates is known with certainty. When ²>0,a
small value of ρ0 no longer implies the model is close to one in which the government type is
always known with certainty.
Instead, consider a sequence of economies where both ρ0 and ² go to zero. In particular,
while formally possible, it makes little sense to consider ρ0 <²b e c a u s et h i si m p l i e st h e
government starts with a worse reputation than is possible at any point later in the game.
Given this, a natural sequence of economies which converges to the common knowledge
benchmark is where ² → 0 and ρ0 = ² (the worst possible continuation reputation) at each
point in the sequence. I next show that this sequence has a limit where µ(ρ0) remains interior
and V (ρ0) > 0.
To this end, deﬁne N(²) as the smallest integer such that ρ
0∗N(²)(²) > ρ∗. The following
limiting results are obtained: First, as ² goes to zero, N(²) goes to inﬁnity. That is, after
ac o n ﬁscation, it takes an arbitrarily large number of consecutive nonconﬁscations for all
households to produce. Second, as ² → 0, π(²) → π∗ (which is interior), and (as stated
earlier) µ(²) remains interior and V (²) > 0. Since the posterior ρ evolves according to
ρ0∗(ρ)=ρ(1 − δ − ²)/ρ∗ + ², this implies that as ρ0 = ² → 0, ρ is almost always very near
zero. Thus, µ is almost always approximately equal to lim²→0 µ(²), and π is almost always
approximately equal to π∗. These results are proved in the following lemma.
17Lemma 7. For given values of (β,τ,q,c,ρ0,δ), lim²→0 N(²)=∞, lim²→0 π(²)=π∗, 0 <
lim²→0 µ(²) < 1,a n dlim²→0 V (²) > 0.
Proof. The function ρ
0∗(ρ)=ρ(1−δ −²)/ρ∗ +² implies that as ² → 0, ρ
0∗(ρ)=ρ(1−δ)/ρ∗.
Since ρ∗ < 1− δ, this function is simply a constant greater than one multiplying ρ, implying
that lim²→0 N(²)=∞.N e x t ,s i n c eπ(ρ)=π∗/(1−ρ), lim²→0 π∗/(1−²)=π∗. From Lemma 5,
q + β(1 − ²)V (²) >
τq
























The Markov perfect equilibrium examined in this paper is not the unique equilibrium. Con-
sider the following history-dependent strategy starting from ρ0 = ²:F o rt h eﬁrst N −1 dates
(where N is as deﬁned above), µ =0and π(ρi)=π∗/(1 − ρi) (where for all i, ρi is the
same as in the Markov perfect equilibrium). From date N on, regardless of the play of the
government from dates 1 to N −1, µ =1and π =0 .I ft h eg o v e r n m e n tc o n ﬁscates at date N
or later, this strategy starts over. This strategy always satisﬁes household optimization and
satisﬁes the optimization of the bad government if (1 − β
N(1 − ²)N)τq/(1 − β(1 − ²)) ≥ q.
Further, as ² → 0, because N(²) →∞ , this equilibrium has a value which converges to zero,
18the value of the Markov perfect equilibrium and worst equilibrium when ρ0 = ² =0 .T h u s
while there is a discontinuity in the value of the Markov perfect equilibrium at ρ0 = ² =0 ,
there is no discontinuity at this point regarding the value of the worst equilibrium.
8. Conclusion
I have presented a simple model in which in the unique Markov Perfect equilibrium, bad
governments do not always act in an untrustworthy manner, but instead randomize. While
not proved here, the logic that a bad government always acting in an untrustworthy manner
cannot be a Markov perfect equilibrium should generalize to other models. In Chari and
Kehoe (1990), the Markov perfect equilibrium (which is also the worst equilibrium) has no
household ever investing because the benevolent government will always conﬁscate whatever
investment is made. However, if as in my model, there is always a positive probability that the
government simply cannot conﬁscate all investment, then by deviating and not conﬁscating, a
government can cheaply acquire a reputation as the type which cannot conﬁscate. The same
should hold in models of monetary growth, debt repudiation, and capital taxation, with or
without a benevolent government.
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